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Abstract. Secure sketch produces public information of its input w
without revealing it, yet, allows the exact recovery of w given another
value w′ that is close to w. Therefore, it can be used to reliably repro-
duce any error-prone secret (i.e., biometrics) stored in secret storage.
However, some sources have lower entropy compared to the error itself,
formally called “more error than entropy”, a standard secure sketch can-
not show its security promise perfectly to this kind of sources. This paper
focuses on secure sketch. We propose an explicit construction for secure
sketch. We show correctness and security to all sources with meaningful
min-entropy at least a single bit. Besides, our construction comes with
efficient recovery algorithm operates in polynomial time in the sketch
size, which can tolerate high number of error rate arbitrary close to 1/2
for random error. The above result offers polynomial time solution to
two NP-complete coding problems, suggesting P=NP.
Keywords: Secure Sketch · Information Theory · Coding Theory · Fuzzy
Extractor
1 Introduction
Traditional cryptography systems rely on uniformly distributed and recoverable
random strings for secret. For example, random passwords, tokens, and keys.
These secrets must present exactly on every query for a user to be authenticated
and get accessed into the system. Besides, it must also consist of high enough
entropy, thus making it very long and complicated, further resulted in the diffi-
culty in memorizing it. On the other hand, there existed plentiful non-uniform
strings to be utilized for secrets in practice. For instance, biometrics (i.e., human
iris, fingerprint) which can be used for human recognition/identification purpose.
Similarly, long passphrase (S. N. Porter, 1982 [1]), answering several questions
for secure access (Niklas Frykholm et al., 2001 [2]) or personal entropy system
(Ellison et al., 2000 [3]), and list of favorite movies (Juels and Sudan, 2006 [4]),
all are non-uniformly distributed random strings that can be utilized for secrets.
The availability of non-uniform information prompted the generation of uni-
form random string from non-uniform materials. Started by Bennett et al.,
(1988) [5], identified two major steps in deriving a uniform string from noisy
non-uniform sources. The first one is information-reconciliation, by tolerating
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the errors in the sources without leaking any information. The second one refers
to the privacy amplification, which converts high entropy input into a uniformly
random input. The information-reconciliation process can be classified into inter-
active (includes multi messages) and non-interactive (only includes single mes-
sage) versions. For non-interactive line of work, it has been first defined by Dodis
et al., (2004) [6] called the fuzzy extractor. Likewise, the fuzzy extractor used
two steps to accomplish the task, which is the secure sketch (for error tolerance),
and randomness extractor (for uniform string generation). Secure sketch is de-
manding because it enables information-reconciliation, e.g., exact recovery of a
noisy secret while offering security assurance to it. Moreover, a secure sketch can
be easily extended to fuzzy extractor for uniform string generation by using a
randomness extractor. The generated random string can be used in independent
security system for access control, identification, digital signature, etc.
This work focuses on secure sketch. We reviewed the limitations of current
secure sketch constructions in Section 1.1. To overcome such limitations, we
adopted the usage of resilience vector (RV) in Section 5 to support better under-
standing of the structure of the sources. We proposed an explicit construction
with included RV for sketching and recovery (secure sketch) in Section 6 and
7 respectively. Our proposed recovery mechanism has shown to be efficient in
polynomial in the sketch size and allows error tolerance of error rate arbitrary
close to 1/2 (Section 9). In the end, in Section 11 we formalize the security of our
construction and show security to all sources with meaningful entropy at least
single bit. We also compared our proposal with existing secure sketch construc-
tion, showing our construction enjoys the better lower bound of min-entropy
requirement for a standard secure sketch (Section 12).
1.1 Issues in Existing Secure Sketch Construction
Various secure sketch constructions can be found in the literature. Some notable
constructions involved the code-offset construction proposed by Juels and Wat-
tenberg (1999) [7] that operates perfectly over hamming matric space. Besides,
Juels and Sudan (2006) [4] have also proposed another construction for met-
ric other than hamming called the fuzzy vault. Besides, Dodis et al., (2004) [6]
have proposed an improved version of the fuzzy vault, and also the Pin-sketch
construction that relies upon generic syndrome encoding/decoding with t-error
correcting BCH code C, which works well for non-fixed length input over a uni-
verse U .
However, the above mentioned secure sketch construction only works for lim-
ited sources. Briefly, given a point (some value) w, the sketch would allow the
acceptance of its nearby point w′ within distance t for exact recovery of w. There-
fore, if an adversary can predict an accepting w′ with noticeable probability, the
sketch must reveal w to the adversary with noticeable probability as well. The
tension between security and error tolerance capability is very strong. Precisely,
the security is measured in terms of the residual (min-) entropy, which is the
starting entropy of w minus the entropy loss. Given some non-uniform sources
with low min-entropy, especially, when the sources consist of more error than
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entropy itself, deducting the entropy loss from the sources’ min-entropy always
outputs a negative value, hence, show no security. Because of this, correcting t
errors regardless of the structure of the input distribution would have to assume
sufficient high min-entropy to the input sources. To show meaningful security for
standard secure sketch, the min-entropy must at least half of the input length
itself [8], hence, limiting the availability of secure sketch construction for low
entropy sources.
Through exploitation of the struction of the input distributions, Fuller et al.,
(2013) [9] have show that the crude entropy loss over ‘more error than entropy’
sources can be avoided by the measurement of fuzzy min-entropy, which defined
as the min-entropy with maximized chances for a variable of W within distance
t of w′:
Hfuzzt,∞(W )
def
= − log
(
max
w′
Pr[W ∈ Bt(w
′)]
)
,
where Bt(w
′) denoted a hamming ball of radius t around w′. Conceivably, the
fuzzy min-entropy is equivalent to the residual entropy, which is at least the
min-entropy H∞ (W ) minus the loss signified by the hamming ball Bt(w
′) of
radius t, s.t.
Hfuzzt,∞(W ) ≥ H∞ (W )− log(Bt(w
′)).
Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) is useful for security measurement instead of H∞ (W ) especially when
the residual entropy shows negative value (i.e. more error than entropy). How-
ever, due to the fact that Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) depends upon the error tolerance distance t,
and it is not necessary referring to the worst-case distribution for W , therefore,
traditional way of showing security with Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) measurement have to deal
with such distribution uncertainty by considering a family of distributions W
for different variables i.e., {W1,W2, . . .} ∈ W rather than single distribution.
Viewed this way, Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) measurement is only sufficient for computational se-
cure sketch construction [9], [10], which means that the security property of such
construction only hold for computationally bounded attacker (i.e., polynomial
time bounded) accompanies with strong assumption on the user has a precise
knowledge over W . However, it is unrealistic to assume every sources distribu-
tion can be modelled precisely, especially for high entropy sources like human
biometric.
2 Overview Results
We highlighted our main four results as follow.
It was believed that the exploitation of the input structure is necessary [11]
to construct a secure sketch for all sources. Follow in this way, our works adopted
the principle of Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) to generate a resilient vectors
pair (trivially, a pair of longer strings with resilience property) for sketching and
recovery. Details discussion on the resilient vector (RV) is covered in Section 5.
The RV pair possessing resilience property, i.e., distance preserving that is useful
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for the exploitation of the input sources structure. Our first result is the metric
of correlation measure between the RV pair and their input pair (Eq. 1 and Eq.
2).
Since the RV is used for sketching, such correlation measurement implies
the entropy loss from the input. Therefore, the minimum entropy loss from the
sketch reduced to the maximum correlation measured in between the RV pair,
conditioned on their inputs. We formalize such minimum entropy loss based
on the maximum tolerance distance tmax over any random input distribution,
which implies maximum probability in looking for a nearby (similar) point within
distance tmax (Corollary 1). This result is later being used for our reduction from
fuzzy minimum entropy to Shannon entropy, to show necessary and sufficient
condition for a system’s security (see Section 12.2).
Thirdly, we show that the minimum entropy loss of our construction could
be at least three bits with BCH error correction codes. A Tighter result is also
obtained by considering random error correction codes are used instead of BCH
codes (Proposition 3), revealing the minimum entropy loss could be at least one
bits (Eq. 15). This pushed the lower bound of minimum entropy requirement of
our secure sketch construction to accept any sources of entropy at least one bit,
which is much lower compared to existing constructions. Nonetheless, above re-
sult is computational. It later is being used to derive the well-known information-
theoretical bound (Shannon bound) and shown to be coincided with another
computational bound commonly studied in coding theory research (Gilbert-
Varshamov bound) (see Section 12.1), lead us to the claim of computational
secure sketch implies information-theoretical sketch.
The last result we would like to highlight is the efficiency of the recovery
algorithm in our construction. Without the consideration of the computational
power in running the recovery algorithm, the recovery of the input from the
sketch can be done with high probability (close to one) given the sketch size is
large enough (Proposition 1). On the other hand, considering the computational
power in running the recovery algorithm, we noticed that higher computational
power, i.e., exponential time in the input (Eq. 9) is needed in order to tolerate
more errors. Nonetheless, such exponential computation time can be formalized
to polynomial time in the sketch size to ensure efficient recovery while allowing
more errors to be tolerated (Proposition 2). This result shows deep connection
in between a difficult decoding problem over smaller metric space (of size k∗)
could be reduced down to a more manageable problem over larger metric space
n > k∗, suggesting P=NP.
3 Preliminaries
There are some preliminaries to introduce the background of a standard secure
sketch, entropy, and error correction code.
Min-Entropy: For security, one is always interested in the probability for an
adversary to predict a random value, i.e., guessing a secret. For a random variable
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W , max
w
Pr[W = w ] is the adversary’s best strategy to guess the most likely
value, also known as the predictability of W . The min-entropy thus defined as
H∞ (W ) = − log (max
w
Pr[W = w ])
min-entropy also viewed as worst-case entropy.
Conditioned min-entropy: Given pair of random variable W , and W ′ (possi-
ble correlated), given an adversary find out the value w′ ofW ′, the predictability
of W is now become max
w
Pr[W = w |W ′ = w′ ]. The conditioned min-entropy
of W given W ′ is defined as
H˜∞ (W |W
′ ) = − log
(
Ew′←W ′
[
max
w
Pr[W = w |W ′ = w′ ]
])
Error correction code: [12] Let q ≥ 2 be an integer, let [q] = {1, . . . , q}, we
called an [n, k, d]q-ary code C consist of following properties:
– C is a subset of [q]n, where n is an integer referring to the blocklength of C.
– The dimension of code C can be represented as |C| = [q]k = V
– The rate of code C to be the normalized quantity kn
– The min-distance between different codewords defined as min
c,c∗∈C
dis(c, c∗)
It is convenient to view code C as a function C : [q]k → [q]n. Viewed this
way, the elements of V can be considered as a message v ∈ V and the process to
generate its associated codeword C(v) = c is called encoding. Viewed this way,
encoding a message v of size k, always adding redundancy to produce codeword
c ∈ [q]n of longer size n. Nevertheless, for any codeword c with at most t = ⌊d−12 ⌋
symbols are being modified to form c′, it is possible to uniquely recover c from c′
by using certain function f s.t. f(c′) = c. The procedure to find the unique c ∈ C
that satisfied dis(c, c′) ≤ t by using f is called as decoding. A code C is said to
be efficient if there exists a polynomial time algorithm for encoding and decoding.
Linear error correction code [12]: Linear error correction code is a linear
subspace of Fnq . A q-ary linear code of blocklength n, dimension k and minimum
distance d is represented as [n, k, d]q code C. For a linear code, a string with all
zeros 0n is always a codeword. It can be specified into one of two equivalent ways
with a generator matrix G ∈ Fn×kq or parity check matrix H ∈ F
(n−k)×n
q :
– a [n, k, d]q linear code C can be specified as the set {Gv : v ∈ F
k
q} for an n×k
metric which known as the generator matrix of C.
– a [n, k, d]q linear code C can also be specified as the subspace {x : x ∈ F
n
q
and Hx = 0n} for an (n − k) × n metric which known as the parity check
matrix of C.
For any linear code, the linear combination of any codewords is also consid-
ered as a codeword over Fnq . Often, the encoding of any message v ∈ F
k
q can be
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done with O(nk) operations (by multiplying it with the generator matrix, i.e.,
Gv. The distance between two linear codewords refers to the number of disagree
elements between them, also known as the hamming distance.
Sometime, we refer [n, k, d] code C as [n, k, t] code C if the error tolerance
distance t is of interested rather than its minimum distance d.
Secure sketch: [6] An (M,m, m˜, t)-secure sketch is a pair of randomized pro-
cedures “sketch” (SS) and “Recover” (Rec), with the following properties:
SS: takes input w ∈ M returns a secure sketch (e.g., helper string) ss ∈
{0, 1}∗.
Rec: takes an element w′ ∈ M and ss. If dis(w,w′) ≤ t for some tolerance
threshold t, then Rec(w′, ss) = w with probability 1 − β, where β is some
negligible quantity. If dis(w,w′) > t, then no guarantee is provided about
the output of Rec.
The security property of secure sketch guarantees that for any distributionW
overM with min-entropy m, the values of W can be recovered by the adversary
who observes ss with probability no greater than 2−m˜. That is the residual
entropy H˜∞ (W |W
′ ) ≥ m˜.
4 Main Idea
We here highlight some common notation to be used in this work, and a brief
overview of our construction, focus on binary metric space.
4.1 Notations
LetM1 = {0, 1}
k∗ , andM2 = {0, 1}
n denote two different sizes of metric spaces
where n > k∗. The distance between different binary string w and w′ denoted
as dis(w,w′) is the binary hamming distance (e.g., the number of disagree ele-
ments), i.e., dis(w,w′) = ‖w ⊕ w′‖ where ‖.‖ is the hamming weight that count
the number of non-zero elements, and ⊕ is the addition modulo two operation
(XOR). Besides, the error rate in between the input w w′ ∈ M1 is denoted as
‖w ⊕ w′‖ (k∗)−1 which is simply their normalized hamming distance.
Our construction used two linear codes. We called one of these as ‘inner’
code Cin, and another one called ‘outer’ code Cout. Although not necessary, it is
convenient to refer both chosen linear codes to be BCH codes [13] with parameter
[n∗, k∗, t∗]2 for Cin and [n, k, t]2 for Cout, where k
∗ ≤ n∗ < k ≤ n holds. This
is because the family of BCH codes has been well-studied and formed a large
class of error correction code perfectly suit for binary input string. Moreover, it
accompanies with efficient decoding algorithm f namely the syndrome decoding
operates in O(nt)[13]. The tolerance rate of code Cin and Cout are denoted as
ξ∗ = t∗/n∗ and ξ = t/n respectively.
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4.2 Overview Construction
We here provide a brief overview of our sketching and recovery proposal for one
to conceal a random string (encoded codeword) c∗ ∈ {0, 1}n
∗
while allows exact
recovery of c∗ by using another noisy string w′e′ ∈ {0, 1}
k∗ that is close to the
noisy string we used on sketching.
Sketching: The proposed sketching procedure can be viewed as a two steps
encoding process. First, one encodes w using the ‘inner’ code Cin to output a
codeword c∗. Then, c∗ is randomly distorted by using some noisy string we,
where the corrupted codeword, viewed as a syndrome vector vsyn ∈ {0, 1}
n∗ .
The syndrome vector is then being padded with zeros to form a longer bit string
and encoded by the ‘outer’ code Cout to output the final codeword c ∈ Cout. The
final sketch is generated by concealing c with an offset δ that is characterized
by a pair of resilient vectors φ, φ′ ∈ {0, 1}n. In different to existing construction,
our sketching proposal consists of additional randomization with random noisy
string we used to distort the original codeword c
∗. Then, the distorted codeword
is being encoded into larger codeword c and distorted again using RV to generate
the final sketch. The noisy string introduced during sketching phase facilitates
our studies of any random events potentially corrupting the codewords follows
the random distribution of the noisy string we.
Recovery: For recovery, we are more interested in the event when the person
in recovering w does not know the distribution of the introduced noisy string
we during sketching phase. Therefore our recovery procedure is defined to be
adversarial. Nevertheless, he/she can use some random noisy string w′e′ and
its corresponding RV, φ′ to try to decode the corrupted codeword from the
sketch. The zero-padded in front of the syndrome vector acts as an indicator
to notify him/her the successfulness of the decoding results (i.e., first few bits
are all zeros). More formally, our recovery procedure requires one to determine
the distribution of noisy string we introduced during sketching, and look for the
similar noisy string w′e′ (that viewed as the pre-image of we) i.e., ‖w
′
e′ ⊕ we‖ ≤ t
′
to achieve error tolerance hence recover w successfully.
5 Resilient Vector: Properties and Generation
Since RV is a core element of our construction, we here provide details discussion
on its properties and how it can be generated. The usage of RV into cryptog-
raphy is first introduced by Ronald L. Rivest [14] in 2016. Its main concept is
derived from Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) defined as below.
Locality Sensitive Hashing [15] Given that P2 > P1, while w,w
′ ∈ M, and
H = hi :M→U , where U refers to the output metric space (after hashing),
which comes along with a similarity function S, where i is the number of hash
functions hi. A locality sensitive hashing can be viewed as a probability distribu-
tion over a family H of hash functions follows Ph∈H[h(w) = h(w
′)] = S(w,w′).
In particular, the similarity function S described the hashed collision probability
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in between w and w′.
Ph∈H(hi(w) = hi(w
′)) ≤ P1, if S(w,w
′) < R1
Ph∈H(hi(w) = hi(w
′)) ≥ P2, if S(w,w
′) > R2
LSH transforms input w and w′ to its output metric space U with property that
ensuring similarity inputs render higher probability of collision over U , and vice
versa.
For RV generation, we only focus on a particular LSH family called hamming-
hash [16]. The hamming hash is considered as one of the easiest ways to construct
an LSH family by bit sampling technique.
Hamming hash strategy: Let [k∗] = {1, . . . , k∗}. For Alice with w ∈ {0, 1}k
∗
and Bob with w′ ∈ {0, 1}k
∗
. Alice and Bob agreed on this strategy as follow:
1. They are told to each other a common random integer N ∈ [k∗].
2. They separately output ‘0’ or ‘1’ depend upon their private string w and w′,
i.e., Alice output ‘1’ if the N -th bit of w is ‘1’, else output ‘0’.
3. They win if they got the same output, i.e., w(N) = w′(N).
Based on above strategy, we are interested in the probability for Alice and Bob
outputting the same value. This probability can be described by a similarity
function S(w,w′) = P where P ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 1. Hamming hash strategy is a LSH with similarity function S(w,w′) =
1− ‖w ⊕ w′‖(k∗)−1
The hamming hash strategy can also be operated in between Alice and
Bob in an non-interactive way. To do so, Alice and Bob simply repeat Step
1 and Step 2 for n number of times with a set of pre-shared integers N =
[N(1), N(2), . . . , N(n)] ∈ [k∗]n chosen randomly and uniformly over [k∗]n. In
the end, they can output a n bits string φ, and φ′ respectively over {0, 1}n,
which we have earlier named as resilient vectors. We denote such non-interactive
hamming-hash algorithm as Ω :M1 × [k
∗]n →M2, which serves to sample the
input binary string of size k∗ into a longer binary string a.k.a resilient vector of
size n > k∗.
Given input w ∈ {0, 1}k
∗
, and N ∈ [k∗]n, algorithm Ω : M1 × [k
∗]n →M2
can be described as follow:
Ω(w,N)
1 : φ ← ∅
2 : for i = 1, . . . , n do
3 : parse x = w(N(i))/ x is the N(i)-th bits of w
4 : φ = φ‖x
5 : endfor
6 : return φ
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Theorem 2. Suppose two resilient vectors φ, φ′ ∈ {0, 1}n are generated from
w,w′ ∈ {0, 1}k
∗
respectively using hamming hash algorithm Ω with a random
integer string N ∈ [k∗]
n
, then E[‖φ⊕ φ′‖ ] = n ‖w ⊕ w′‖ (k∗)−1.
5.1 Correlation Measure in RVs
Let Φ and Φ′ be two random variables over {0, 1}n, andW andW ′ be two random
variables over {0, 1}k
∗
. Given a resilience vector φ ∈ Φ generated from w ∈ W
with random string N , it follows Φ must correlate with W where the probability
to look for any random variable Φ ∈ Bt(φ
′) (also means similar resilience vector
s.t. ‖φ⊕ φ′‖ ≤ t) varies conditioned on eitherW 6∈ Bt′(w
′) orW ∈ Bt′(w
′). Note
that W ∈ Bt′(w
′) implies the inputs w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′ must similar within
distance t′ (e.g. ‖w ⊕ w′‖ ≤ t′), while W ∈ Bt′(w
′) means ‖w ⊕ w′‖ > t′. Such
correlation can be measured by using the conditional probability described as
Pr[Φ ∈ Bt(φ
′) |W 6∈ Bt′(w
′) ] or Pr[Φ 6∈ Bt(φ
′) |W ∈ Bt′(w
′) ] respectively. In
particular, we are more interested in the maximum correlation, which can be
expressed by the conditioned maximum probability in looking for Φ ∈ Btmax(φ
′)
given W 6∈ Bt′
(+)
(w′) for some maximum distances tmax ≥ t (over {0, 1}
n) and
t′(+) > t
′ (over {0, 1}k
∗
) defined as:
max
t=tmax
Pr
[
Φ 6∈ Bt(φ
′)
∣∣∣W 6∈ Bt′
(+)
(w′)
]
.
≥ Ew′←W ′
[
max
φ′
Pr[Φ ∈ Bt(φ
′) |W 6∈ Bt′(w
′) ]
]
. (1)
On the other hand, the conditioned maximum probability in looking for Φ 6∈
Bt(φ
′) given W ∈ Bt′(w
′) for some minimum distances tmin ≤ t (over {0, 1}
n)
and t′(−) < t
′ (over {0, 1}k
∗
) is defined as:
max
t=tmin
Pr
[
Φ 6∈ Bt(φ
′)
∣∣∣W 6∈ Bt′
(−)
(w′)
]
≥ Ew′←W ′
[
max
φ′
Pr[Φ ∈ Bt(φ
′) |W 6∈ Bt′(w
′) ]
]
(2)
6 Sketching
We denote the sketching algorithm that employs the hamming-hash algorithm,
Ω, an [n∗, k∗, t∗]2 ‘inner’ code Cin and an [n, k, t]2 ‘outer’ code Cout as SSΩ,Cin,Cout .
The sketching algorithm SSΩ,Cin,Cout with random inputs w,N , and ǫss is de-
scribed as follow:
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SSΩ,Cin,Cout(w,N, ǫss)
1 : Ess ←$ {0, 1}
k∗/ initiate a random distribution Ess with error parameter ǫss
2 : e←$Ess/ sample e uniformly at random from Ess, where ‖e‖ =
⌊
k∗ǫss
⌋
3 : c∗ = Cin(w); / encode w
4 : we = w ⊕ e;
5 : vsyn = c
∗ ⊕ (0n
∗
−k∗‖we)
6 : v∗ = 0k−n
∗
‖vsyn;
7 : c = Cout(v
∗); / encode v∗
8 : φ ← Ω(we, N)
9 : ss = c⊕ φ;
10 : return ss
Our sketching procedure consists of mainly two encoding stages. Given an
random input string w ∈ {0, 1}k
∗
, the first encoding stage used Cin to encode
a random string w to generate a codeword c∗ ∈ {0, 1}n
∗
. Viewed this way, c∗
can be any random codeword over Cin, including the trivial codeword of all
zeros i.e. c∗ = 0n
∗
. Then, we generate a noisy string we and pad it with zeros
in front to generate a longer bit string, which can be viewed as the syndrome
vector denoted as vsyn = c
∗ ⊕ (0n
∗−k∗‖we). The syndrome vector itself is also
a codeword vsyn ∈ Cin. Clearly, vsyn conceals c
∗ by using we, where the vector
(0n
∗−k∗‖we) acts as some random errors used to distort the original codeword
c∗, lead to at most
∥∥(0n∗−k∗‖we)∥∥ = ‖we‖ bits flipped in c∗. Then, the second
encoding stage used Cout to encode v
∗ = 0k−n
∗
‖vsyn to generate the final code
word c. The 0k−n
∗
zeros in front is used to notify the recovery algorithm if the
decoding is success. The final sketch is formed by hiding c with RV generated
from we.
For the realization of the noisy string we, we parse additional error to the orig-
inal input w using a random error vector e ∈ Ess sampled uniformly at random
follows some random distribution Ess. Such error distribution is parametrized by
an error parameter ǫss chosen within range ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4]. To be specific,
all error vector e ∈ Ess is of weight ‖e‖ = ⌊k
∗ǫss⌋, and the generation of the
noisy string follows we = w ⊕ e. The error vector e is leaving in clear after it is
parsed into the input w to form we.
All steps on SSΩ,Cin,Cout(w,N, ǫss) can be done in O(n
3), and the size of ss
is now depend upon the blocklength n of the chosen ‘outer’ code Cout.
Remark here the distribution for w and e are considered to be random in
our case. The random string N ∈ [k∗]n is chosen in random and uniform over
[k∗]n. By LSH definition and Theorem 2, the generated RV is i.i.d, where every
single bit of the RV follows the distribution of the noisy string we. Since the
sketch ss is generated by concealing c using RV φ, its distribution shall follows
the generated RV, depends upon the input noisy string we ∈ {0, 1}
k∗. In such
a case, the same random string N can be made public and reused, where the
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distribution of the generated sketch is only input dependence, i.e., depends upon
the distribution of the noisy string we.
7 Recovery
We denote the recover algorithm that employed the hamming-hash algorithm, Ω,
an [n∗, k∗, t∗]2 ‘inner’ code Cin and an [n, k, t]2 ‘outer’ code Cout as RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f .
The recover algorithm RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f with inputs ss, w
′, N , ǫrec to recover w is
described as follow:
RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f(ss, w
′, N, ǫrec)
1 : Erec ←$ {0, 1}
k∗/ initiate Erec with error parameter ǫrec
2 : for i = 1, . . . , |supp(Erec)|
3 : e′i ←$Erec/ sample e
′
i
differently at random, where
∥
∥e′
i
∥
∥ =
⌊
k∗ǫrec
⌋
4 : w′e′
i
= w′ ⊕ e′i
5 : φ′i ← Ω(w
′
e′
i
, N)
6 : c′i = ss⊕ φ
′
i/ also ss ⊕ φ
′
i
= c⊕ (φ⊕ φ′
i
)
7 : c ← f(c′i)/ first decoding
8 : set v∗ = C−1out(c)
9 : if v∗[1], . . . , v∗[k − n∗] = 0k−n
∗
/ first k − n∗ bits of v∗ are zeros
10 : set v′syn as the last n
∗ elements of v′∗
11 : c′∗ = v′syn ⊕ (0
n∗−k∗‖w′e′
i
)
12 : c∗ ← f(c′∗)/ second decoding
13 : return w = Cin
−1(c∗)
14 : break
15 : endif
16 : endfor
Our recovery process is defined to be adversarial s.t. the person in recovering
w does not know the input error distribution Ess introduced on sketching. Hence,
different notation is used to denote the error distribution used in the recovery
phase, e.g., Ess for sketching, and Erec for recovery. In particular, the non-trivial
case (noisy) where the input w is distorted by e ∈ Ess is of our interest. Therefore
it is good to set ǫrec ≥ ǫss ≥ (2k
∗)−1 for the mean of determining the error vector
e ∈ Ess (introduced during sketching) for recovery of w.
The recovery algorithm consists of mainly two decoding stages. The first
decoding stage is designed to be an iterative decoding uses Cout and f. It can
be conveniently viewed as a brute-force decoding procedure of |supp(Erec)| trials
with recovery error distribution Erec (parametrized by ǫrec), means to recover
the syndrome vector vsyn. For each iteration in the first decoding stage, if the
first k − n∗ bits of v∗ are all zeros, the decoding is viewed as success and thus
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the recovery algorithm could proceed to the second decoding stage to recover c∗
and so w from vsyn using Cin.
The second decoding stage uses Cin and f to decode the corrupted syndrome
vector (viewed as the corrupted codeword c′∗) to recover c∗. The decoding itself
must success if
∥∥∥we ⊕ w′e′
i
∥∥∥ ≤ t∗, thus w can be recovered from c∗.
8 Distribution Hiding with Random Error Parsing
In this section, we provide a discussion over the action of random error parsing is
necessary to show security for a given source. In fact, the random error parsing
process can also be interpreted as any randomization and perturbation process
(i.e., hashing or encryption) applied to the input w ∈ M1 with some random
error distribution Ess. Viewed this way, Step 4 of SSΩ,Cin,Cout can be succinctly
replaced by some random function f : M1 ×M1 → M1 with input w and e,
to output we as a random noisy string. Same function f also applied on Step 4
of RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f with input w
′ and different e′i to output we′i . Nonetheless, since
our focus only on error tolerance, we would stick to the simplest case where the
random error parsing process is simply an addition modulo two (XOR) process.
We start from the sketching algorithm, which accepts any random input w
in some random distribution W overM1. Such input would yield a random RV
φ ∈ Φ in random distribution Φ over M2 via RV generation using some public
known random string N . Tolerating t errors using an [n, k, t] error correction
code eventually reveal W . This is because the encoding process must ensure all
random variable W ∈ Bt(w
′) can be tolerated using decoding function f, there-
fore, for any input string w ∈W , encoding w must store additional information
that is manifested by the neighbourhood of w within distance t. Doing so in-
evitably introduced t information loss. When t is larger than the entropy of the
source, the source is said to loss all entropy and no security to show.
To resolve the above issue, a straightforward way is to hide W before adding
redundancy to it. This can be done by parsing an error randomly and uni-
formly chosen from a list {e1, . . . , e|supp(Ess)|} ∈ Ess into the input string w
during the sketching phase. Doing so means the generated noisy string we is
now randomly and uniformly distributed over a family of distributions W , i.e.,
we ∈ W = {W1, . . . ,W|supp(Ess)|}. Because the distribution of RV is input de-
pendence, it follows the generated RV φ ∈ Ψ = {Φ1, . . . , Φ|supp(Ess)|} is also
randomly and uniformly distributed in a family of i.i.d distribution Ψ . Remark
here when |Ψ | = |W| = |supp(Ess)| = 1, it corresponds to the trivial case when
the error vector e ∈ Ess is all zeros (noiseless). This also means that the original
distribution of the variable W is now hidden over W randomly and uniformly.
Therefore, for the non-trivial case, it is more appropriate to consider the fam-
ily of distributions in W and Ψ rather than single distribution in deriving the
security of the sketch. Compared to the generic BCH encoding procedure, our
proposed sketching algorithm can be viewed as a more general encoding proce-
dure by considering a more general case where the error parameter ǫss > 0 (or
‖e‖ ≥ 0) is introduced during the sketching phase.
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Because the sketch is generated by concealing the final codeword c with an
RV φ. It follows that the worst-case security of the sketch is manifested by
the maximum error tolerance distance over Ψ , where the probability to find a
random variable Φ ∈ Btmax(φ
′), i.e., similar RV (given φ′) over Ψ is maximum.
In particular, we let ξ = t/n = ‖we ⊕ w
′‖(k∗)−1. For ξ ≥ ǫss, such maximum
distance (over {0, 1}n) can be described as
tmax = n(ξ − ǫss) ≥ t ≥ 0.
Recall the generated RV is input dependence (depends upon the noisy string
we), thus, Φ is conditioned on the original distribution of the variable W . To
look for tmax, we first define a maximum tolerance distance (over {0, 1}
k∗) as
t′(+) = (ξ + ǫss)k
∗,
for all distribution of W ∈ W after random error parsing, which is distributed
(hidden) randomly and uniformly over W . Remark here t is now denoted to be
input dependence. The original distribution of the variable W may be different
for different input string w ∈ W before random error parsing. This means the
distance ‖we ⊕ w
′‖(k∗)−1 shall be different and so for the value of t (or ξ) as
well. Nevertheless, for ǫss ≥ (2k
∗)−1 > 0, the defined maximum distance t′(+)
would imply error rate of ξ + ǫss, which is always larger than ξ. Therefore, t
′
(+)
is always maximum for any original distribution of the variable W , hold for all
input string w ∈W .
The Corollary below characterized the worst-case security of RVs. Such secu-
rity is measured in terms of conditioned maximum probability in getting similar
RV within a maximum tolerance distance tmax ≥ t ≥ 0 over Ψ given a noisy
string w′ ∈W ′ over some random distribution W ′ ∈M1.
Corollary 1. Given any random variable W ∈ W, and a random string w′ ∈
W ′. For all RV over a family of distributions Ψ , the conditioned maximum prob-
ability to look for any similar RV φ in any random distribution Φ ∈ Btmax(φ
′)
over Ψ (i.e. ‖φ⊕ φ′‖ = ‖δ‖ ≤ tmax for all φ ∈ Φ) when W 6∈ Bt′
(+)
(w′) is
measured to be
= Ew′←W ′
[
max
φ′
Pr
[
Φ ∈ Bt(φ
′)
∣∣∣W 6∈ Bt′
(+)
(w′)
]]
≤ max
t=tmax
Pr
[
‖δ‖ ≤ t
∣∣∣ ‖we ⊕ w′‖ ≥ t′(+)
]
= Pr
[
‖δ‖ ≤ n(ξ − ǫss)
∣∣∣ ‖we ⊕ w′‖ ≥ t′(+)
]
≤ exp (−2nǫ2ss) (3)
Proof. W 6∈ Bt′
(+)
(w′) means ‖we ⊕ w
′‖(k∗)−1 ≥ ξ + ǫss. For ξ = ‖we ⊕ w
′‖(k∗)−1,
and tmax = n(ξ−ǫss). It follows that nξ ≥ t+nǫss can be yielded by multiplying
both sides of the inequality with n, yielded tmax ≥ t. Then the probability for
‖δ‖ ≤ tmax given ‖we ⊕ w
′‖(k∗)−1 ≥ ξ + ǫss can be computed by Hoeffding’s
inequality follows the last line of Eq. 3.
14 Yen-Lung Lai
By Corollary 1, the conditioned min-entropy of RV over Ψ measured to be
H˜∞ (Ψ |W ) = − log
(
EW←W [Pr[Ψ = Φ |W =W ] ]
)
≥ − log
(
Ew′←W ′
[
max
φ′
Pr
[
Φ ∈ Btmax(φ
′)
∣∣∣W 6∈ Bt′
(+)
(w′)
]])
≥ log(1/ exp (−2nǫ2ss)) (4)
9 Correctness with Regardless Computational Power
Formally, the correctness characterizes the success rate of the recovery of the
original codeword c∗ from a sketch generated by SSΩ,Cin,Cout . In this section, we
study the correctness theoretically without relying on any efficiency argument
over the algorithm pair 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 itself.
Since Cin(w) = c
∗, given Cin, revealing the value of w implies the knowledge
on c∗. Therefore, it is desired to show that the probability of success in revealing
w using algorithm pair 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 is at least (minimum) 1− β
with some negligible probability β > 0. It can be expressed in Eq. 5 below for
all ǫrec ≥ (2k
∗)−1
Pr[RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f(SSΩ,Cin,Cout(w,N, ǫss), w
′, N, ǫrec) = w ] = 1− β. (5)
To measure the minimum probability for Eq. 5, the maximum value of β have to
be computed, which also referring to the maximum error in recovering c∗ from
a sketch with RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f .
To maximize such error for maximum value of β, one shall use a minimum
distance
tmin = n(ξ + ǫss) ≤ t
for any random variable Φ ∈ Ψ in looking for a distinct RV (given φ′), i.e.,
Φ /∈ Btmin(φ
′).
Recall the distribution of RV is input dependence, hence, Φ is conditioned
on the original distribution of the variable W . To look for tmin, we first define a
minimum tolerance distance as
t′(−) = (ξ − ǫss)k
∗
for any distributions of the variableW ∈ W after random error parsing. Clearly,
for ǫss ≥ (2k
∗)−1 > 0, the defined minimum distance t′(−) would imply error
rate of ξ − ǫss, which is always smaller than ξ. At same point, one always need
t′(−) ≤ t
∗ < t holds so that t′(−) is minimum for any original distribution of
the variable W (before random error parsing), which hold for all w ∈ W . The
following Corollary revealing β ≤ exp(−2nǫ2ss).
Corollary 2. Given any random variable W ∈ W, and a random string w′ ∈
W ′. For all RV over a family of distributions Ψ , the conditioned maximum prob-
ability to look for any distinct RV φ in any random distribution Φ 6∈ Btmin(φ
′)
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over Ψ (i.e. ‖φ⊕ φ′‖ = ‖δ‖ ≥ tmin for all φ ∈ Φ) when W ∈ Bt′
(−)
(w′) is
measured to be
Ew′←W ′0
[
max
φ′
Pr
[
Φ 6∈ Btmin(φ
′)
∣∣∣W ∈ Bt′
(−)
(w′)
]]
≤ max
t=tmin
Pr
[
‖δ‖ ≥ t
∣∣∣ ‖we ⊕ w′‖ ≤ t′(−)
]
= Pr
[
‖δ‖ ≥ n(ξ + ǫss)
∣∣∣ ‖we ⊕ w′‖ ≤ t′(−)
]
≤ exp (−2nǫ2ss). (6)
Proof. W ∈ Bt′
(−)
(w′) means ‖we ⊕ w
′‖(k∗)−1 ≤ ξ − ǫss. For ξ = ‖we ⊕ w
′‖(k∗)−1,
and tmin = n(ξ+ǫss), then nξ ≤ t−nǫss can be yielded by multiplying both sides
of the inequality with n, yielded tmin ≤ t. The probability for ‖δ‖ ≥ tmin given
‖we ⊕ w
′‖(k∗)−1 ≤ ξ − ǫss can be computed by Hoeffding’s inequality follows
the last line of Eq. 6.
The following Proposition can be obtained by comparing Eq. 5 and Eq. 6.
Proposition 1. For all ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4], ǫrec ≥ (2k
∗)−1, and ‖we ⊕ w
′‖ ≤
t′(−) ≤ t
∗,
Pr[RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f(SSΩ,Cin,Cout(w,N, ǫss), w
′, N, ǫrec) = w ]
≥ 1− exp (−2nǫ2ss)
Above result showed the recovery of c∗ and so w will success with high probability
when n is sufficiently large without considering the efficiency of the algorithm
pair 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉.
10 Correctness with Regard to Computational Power
This section provided details discussion over the correctness of the algorithm
pair 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 as well as their efficiency in term of compu-
tation complexity. Since k∗ < n, we use n as upper bound and define both
〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 to be efficient if they can run in polynomial time
poly (n) in the input sketch size n to show correctness. Clearly, all steps on
SSΩ,Cin,Cout can be done in poly(n), our efficiency arguments would therefore
only focus on the recovery algorithm RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f itself.
10.1 Computational Reduction of Correctness
Recall our correctness claim in Section 9 comes with bounded probability of error
such that the recovery would success with probability at least 1 − exp(−2nǫ2ss)
given ‖δ‖ ≤ tmax holds. In this subsection, we show that the above derived error
bound can be reduced to merely depends upon the algorithm itself, parametrized
by the number of zero padding in front of vsyn.
To show this, recall RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f will only proceed to the second decoding
if the first decoding return v∗ with the first k − n∗ bits are all zeros. Because
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the selection of the error vector e′ ∈ Erec is random, every iteration of the first
decoding should return a random codeword c ∈ Cout, hence its first k − n
∗ bits
of vsyn are random over {0, 1}
k−n∗ . Such argument holds much stronger when
random generator matrices are used for both Cin and Cout (see coming Subsection
10.3). In this regard, the probability for first k−n∗ bits of vsyn are all zeros can
be described as 2−(k−n
∗). Once the error vector e′ is found (or first decoding is
viewed as succeed), it follows ‖we ⊕ w
′‖ ≤ t′(−) ≤ t
∗, where the second decoding
must success to recover c∗ with probability 1 − 2−(k−n
∗) with error revealed
by the number of zeros padding to the syndrome vector vsyn. Nevertheless, a
necessary condition for above argument to hold would be the case when
β ≤ exp(−2nǫ2ss) ≤ 2
−(k−n∗), (7)
which yielded a tighter upper bound for the derived recovery error β. Without the
exact knowledge of ǫss, there is no straightforward way to determine the value
of n which often yield a meaningful computational reduction to describe the
maximum error exactly as β = 2−(k−n
∗). Nonetheless, since ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4],
the minimum value of n can be set to n = 2(k∗)
2
, it follows (for k − n∗ = 1)
β ≤ exp(−2nǫ2ss) = exp(−4k
2ǫ2ss) = exp(−1) < 2
−(k−n∗) = 2−1.
Doing so can ensure Eq. 7 holds for any ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4] and the recovery
error is maximum which can be described exactly as β = 2−(k−n
∗) = 1/2.
To achieve lower β, higher value of n ≥ 2(k∗)
2
is needed. This suggested that
reducing the recovery error β always need sufficient large n ≥ 2(k∗)
2
and there
is no straightforward way of deducing it given the value of ǫss is unknown.
Above reasoning showed the dependency of our correctness derived previously
in Section 9 reduced to the number of zeros padding in the sketching phase,
measured as k−n∗, conditioned on the value of n is sufficient large. Noting that
such reduction is computational. It means our derived correctness now holds for
any chosen parameters for Cin and Cout with ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4] as long as n is
sufficiently large where k∗ ≤ n∗ < k ≤ n follows.
For instance, under the designation of an BCH code [17], its correctness is
defined using some positive integer m′ ≥ 3. Given a desired value of tolerance
distance t < 2m
′−1, one can construct an [n, k, t] BCH code Cout with parameters
n = 2m
′
−1, n−k ≤ m′t and minimum distance d ≥ 2t− 1. Then, for sufficiently
large n, it is succinct to express
− log(1/β) = k − n∗ = m′ ≥ 3.
Doing so means that once the first decoding is success, its error is bounded by
β ≤ 0.125 corresponds to the number of zeros padding in front of vsyn, i.e.,
at least three zeros. Eventually, the second decoding stage shall success with
probability at least 1− β ≥ 0.875 where ‖we ⊕ w
′‖ ≤ t′(−) ≤ t
∗ follows.
10.2 Tolerating More Error Computationally
So far, our derived correctness theoretically demonstrating at most t′(−) ≤ t
∗
of errors (or error rate of at most ξ − ǫss) can be tolerated over any random
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distribution W ∈ W . It is natural to ask whether one can tolerate more error
(more than t(−)) and what is the maximum achievable error tolerance rate of
our construction.
In fact, it is showed in Corollary 1 it is infeasible to tolerate more than t′(+)
errors because the probability to look for similar RVs is exponentially small
if ‖we ⊕ w
′‖ ≥ t′(+). However, it remains possible for one to tolerate t(+) =⌊
t′(+)
⌋
≤ t′(+) number of errors, significantly more than some minimum value
t(−) =
⌊
t′(−)
⌋
≤ t′(−) computationally.
To show this, for any error (distance) described as ‖we ⊕ w
′‖ = t(+). By
using an error parameter ǫrec ∈ [ǫss, 2ǫss], the final error can be described as
‖we ⊕ w
′
e′‖ = t(+) ± ⌊k
∗ǫrec⌋. In view of this, given high enough value of ǫrec,
i.e. ǫrec = 2ǫss is used for recovery, any error of ‖we ⊕ w
′‖ = t(+) is possi-
ble to be reduced down to ‖we ⊕ w
′
e′‖ = t(−). Eventually, the remaining errors
‖we ⊕ w
′
e′‖ = t(−) ≤ t
′
(−) can be tolerated with high probability follows Propo-
sition 1.
To do so, suppose one does not know the value of ǫss, he/she can try to
choose some value of ǫrec ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/2] (since ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4]) during
recovery. Doing so allow him/her to generate a list of possible error vectors
{e′1, . . . , e
′
|supp(Erec)|
} ∈ Erec, which corresponds to a list of possible noisy strings
w′ei ∈ W
′
i (for i = 1, . . . , |supp(Erec)|) over another family of distributions W
′ =
{W ′1, . . . ,W
′
|supp(Erec)|
}. For each chosen value of ǫrec, one shall have RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f
runs in |supp(Erec)| iterations to try all possible {e
′
1, . . . , e
′
|supp(Erec)|
} ∈ Erec until
he/she found a noisy string w′e′ s.t. ‖we ⊕ w
′
e′‖ = t(−) ≤ t
′
(−) holds. Note that
our recovery process generally covered the trivial case as well when ⌊k∗ǫrec⌋ =
⌊k∗ǫss⌋ = 0 (noiseless case).
More precisely, let d′ = ⌊k∗ξ⌋ denotes the original distance ‖w ⊕ w′‖ = d′.
Parsing an error e ∈ Ess of weight ⌊k
∗ǫss⌋ to the input w ∈ W yields we.
It follows there should be a resultant worst-case error (described in terms of
maximum distance) where
‖we ⊕ w
′‖ = ⌊k∗ξ⌋ ± ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ = d
′ ± ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ = d
′ + ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ = t(+).
Note that when ‖we ⊕ w
′‖ = d′ − ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ = t(−) ≤ t
′
(−) (refers to ‘-’ sign), such
errors is trivial which can be tolerated with probability at least 1 − 2−(k−n
∗)
with sufficiently large n. Our goal is to tolerate the worst-case error, described
as t(+) = d
′ + ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ (refers to the ‘+’ sign). For some random value of ǫss
introduced in sketching, it follows the worst-case error concerning the case when
the value ǫrec is maximum, i.e. ǫrec = 2ǫss. To be specific, there must have a
solution for e′ in the worst-case (when ǫrec = 2ǫss) described as:
‖we ⊕ w
′
e′‖ = ‖(w ⊕ e)⊕ (w
′ ⊕ e′)‖ = ‖(w ⊕ w′)⊕ (e⊕ e′)‖
= (d′ + ⌊k∗ǫss⌋)− ⌊2k
∗ǫss⌋ = d
′ − ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ = t(−). (8)
Clearly, t(−) =
⌊
t′(−)
⌋
≤ t′(−) ≤ t
∗, the error would therefore be tolerated with
high probability given sufficiently large n.
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Nevertheless, to achieve such goal without the knowledge of ǫss, one has to
trial e′ ∈ Erec of different weights for Eq. 8 to hold. Hence, the recovery com-
plexity is always bounded by the maximum brute-force trials with maximum
tolerate distance t(+). In view of this, ones have to deal with the issue of compu-
tational power in running RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f , where the maximum number of iteration
|supp(Erec)| has to be identified to determine maximum recovery complexity for
efficiency investigation.
With ǫrec = 2ǫss, by Stirling approximation, the value |supp(Erec)| can be
bounded as
|supp(Erec)| =
(
k∗
⌊k∗ǫrec⌋
)
=
(
k∗
⌊2k∗ǫss⌋
)
≤ 2k
∗h2(2ǫss), (9)
where h2(x) = −x log(x)− (1−x) log(1−x) is the binary entropy function with
input error rate of x.
Although it remains feasible for one to have the recovery algorithm run in
parallel with all possible value of ǫrec ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/2] using different computa-
tional machine. The overall brute-force complexity is still bounded by the order
of O(2k
∗h2(2ǫss)) for ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4].
10.3 Choosing the Best Code for Difference Sources
Recall that d′ = ⌊k∗ξ⌋, where ξ = ‖we ⊕ w
′‖ (k∗)−1. It is obvious that the value
of t(+) defined in our construction strictly depends upon the input noisy string’s
distribution we ∈ W (or the value of ξ). In such a case, the maximum value for
ξ reveals the maximum achievable distance t(+) for worst-case error tolerance.
Such achievable tolerance distance does not necessary restricted by a particular
choice of error correction code, rather, it is input dependence, i.e. depends upon
the value of d′.
Nonetheless, it is straightforward for one to simply choose a code with spec-
ified tolerance rate ξ = t/n for Cout. In such a case, the value of d
′ = ⌊k∗ξ⌋ can
be determined exactly and so the achievable tolerance distance for worst-case
error t(+) = ⌊2k
∗ξ⌋ is set immediately depends upon the chosen code for Cout.
However, doing so is not always a good practice in reality. This is because if the
error rate introduced during sketching phase is larger than the error tolerance
rate of the chosen code, i.e., ǫss > ξ, the correctness of the recovery algorithm
might not hold. On the other hand, if ǫss < ξ, it may lead to over error tolerance
(i.e., tolerating more error than necessary), hence cannot show security to more
error than entropy sources. In view of this, the best one can do is to look for the
minimum solution of ξ = ǫss (recall ξ ≥ ǫss). Note that doing so is equivalent
to look for the minimum distance d′ for the input pair (w,w′) where the error
rate ǫss introduced during the sketching phase has to be identified. Once such
minimum solution is found, it follows that the knowledge on t(+) is immediate.
Since ξ ≥ ǫss, it follows t(−) ≥ 0. Therefore, the required minimum distance
for w and w′ in our construction can be simply described with ǫss as
‖w ⊕ w′‖ = d′ = ⌊k∗ξ⌋ ≥ ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ ≥ 0. (10)
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By minimum d′ = ⌊k∗ξ⌋ = ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ = 0, it follows
t(−) = 0 ≤ ‖we ⊕ w
′
e′‖ ≤ t
∗ (11)
must hold in order for the second decoding with Cin to success. Hence, one can
always choose the parameters t∗ ≥ 0 for Cin which is trivial for any [n
∗, k∗, t∗]
linear code.
Same thing applied to the outer code Cout. Given such minimum solution is
found (means ξ = ǫss). One shall have tmax = n(ξ− ǫss) = 0. Therefore, one can
simply choose Cout to be any trivial linear code with t = tmax = 0. For the most
easiest way, simply choose two random generator matrices for Cin and Cout with
t∗ = 0 and t = 0 respectively. Doing so means no error tolerance thus c∗ = c∗′
and c = c′i are assumed. In such a case, one can skip both of the decoding
steps (relies on f) and replace it with Gaussian elimination which can be done
efficiently in O(n3).
Focusing on the worst-case error when ǫrec = 2ǫss (follows Eq. 8), the first
affirmative decoding result (first k − n∗ bits of v∗ are zeros) would mean
‖we ⊕ w
′
e′‖ = (d
′ + ⌊k∗ǫss⌋)− ⌊k
∗ǫrec⌋ = 0.
Thus, one shall have the worst-case solution for ǫrec, i.e., ǫrec = 2ǫss, coincides
with the minimum solution when ξ = ǫss s.t.
ǫrec = ǫss = ξ. (12)
For sufficiently large n, the recovery of c∗ would success with probability 1 −
2−(k−n
∗) and the maximum tolerance distance t(+) = d
′ + ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ = ⌊2k
∗ǫss⌋
can also be determined. Since ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4], it means the solution ξ ≤ 1/4
follows. Thus, one able to tolerate at most
t(+) = d
′ + ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ = ⌊k
∗ξ⌋+ ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ ≤ ⌊2k
∗ǫss⌋ = ⌊k
∗/2⌋ (13)
number of errors in the worst-case using our construction with maximum error
rate ǫss = 1/4 introduced in sketching phase.
10.4 Computational Hardness of Recovery: The NP-Complete
problems
Nonetheless, Eq. 9 suggesting exponential computation time in the input size k∗
for all ǫrec ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/2], which is highly inefficient for large k∗. This result
is not suprised because determining the minimum distance of an error correc-
tion code or the minimum distance problem is indeed NP-complete [18]. Besides,
looking for such nontrivial error vector e′ ∈ Erec, which viewed as the minimum-
weight solution to Eq. 8 is another NP-complete problem [19], commonly refer
to the maximum likelihood decoding problem for a linear code [20]. Clearly, if
the later one can be solved easily, then the former problem can also be solved
easily by trying ⌊k∗ǫrec⌋ = 1, 2 . . . (parametrized by ǫrec) with different random
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string w′ to yield a polynomial length of yes/no solutions. More formally, the
corresponding decision version of maximum likelihood decoding problem can be
formalized as follow:
Problem: Maximum likelihood decoding
Instance: A α× n binary matrix H, a vector y ∈ Fα2 , and integer z > 0
Question: Is there a vector x ∈ Fn2 of weight ≤ z, such that Hx = y
Clearly, the answer for above question would be ‘yes’ if one able to find x,
which can be viewed as the solution for e′ ∈ Erec where Eq. 8 holds. More
explicitly, let H be the parity check matrix of Cout, so α = n − k. Note that
Hc ⇔ syn(c) = 0α, where syn(c) is the syndrome of the encoded codeword
c ∈ Cout. Given the corrupted codeword c
′, the RV φ′ and H , the syndrome
decoding algorithm f computes
f(c′) = H · (c⊕ (φ′ ⊕ φ)) = Hc⊕Hδ = 0α ⊕ syn(δ) = syn(δ)
yields the syndrome of δ. Given the distance ‖φ⊕ φ′‖ = ‖δ‖ is small, i.e., ‖δ‖ ≤ t,
knowing syn(δ) is enough to determine the offset δ, which can be done via f in
poly(n) running time.
In our case, by treating x = δ follows the constrain of ‖δ‖ ≤ tmax (see
the proof in Corollary 1), the hardness of looking for δ (of size n) is as hard
as the above mentioned decision problem related to the maximum likelihood
decoding. Nevertheless, recall results in Section 10.1 showed that if e′ ∈ Erec can
be found s.t. ‖we ⊕ w
′
e′‖ ≤ t(−) ≤ t
∗ holds, then ‖δ‖ ≤ tmax can be achieved with
probability at least 1 − 2−(k−n
∗) (conditioned on sufficiently large n). Viewed
this way, efficient searching process for e′ immediately implies efficient maximum
likelihood decoding algorithm, hence resolve the NP-complete problem discussed
above in an efficient manner.
More precisely, the searching process for the error vector e′ can be formalized
by the algorithm 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 to start and end within ⌊k
∗ǫrec⌋ =
0, 1, 2, . . . , ⌊2k∗ǫss⌋ corresponds to the worst-case error rate ǫss introduced during
sketching. Because the recovery process is defined adversarial, the actual value
of ǫss might not known. Nonetheless, we have ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4], hence, the
maximum number of trial would be bounded at most ⌊2k∗ǫss⌋ = ⌊k
∗/2⌋ for a
given value of k∗.
10.5 Deterministic Polynomial Time Recovery
In the last subsection, we have studied that the successful recovery of the original
codeword c∗ using our proposed recovery algorithm is computational hard in the
sense that the process in looking for the nontrivial error vector e′ is NP-complete.
This subsection provided more details discussion on the efficiency of our pro-
posed recovery algorithm. More precisely, we would show that certain minimum
requirement (bound) is required to be satisfied in order to claim efficiency of our
proposed algorithm, hence resolved the above mentioned NP-complete problems.
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Note that the efficiency of our proposed recovery algorithm RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f
strongly depends upon the brute-force complexity itself, which is proportional
to the value of |supp(Erec)|. Given one any chosen values of n
∗ and k for Cin and
Cout respectively s.t. k
∗h2(2ǫss) ≤ k − n
∗, such complexity can be bounded in
terms of the sketch size n described as:
|supp(Erec)| ≤ 2
k∗h2(2ǫss) ≤ 2k−n
∗
= 2m
′
= n+ 1. (14)
Then, by summing all the necessary operation steps (complexity in term of n),
i.e., Step 1+Step 2+....+Step 16 = 1+n+1+...+1 = poly(n) over the recovery
algorithm RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f . The overall complexity of the recovery algorithm can
be expressed as some polynomial function poly(n) using n.
10.6 Efficiency in Average-case and Worst-case scenarios
Our efficient result discussed in previous section suggested padding more zeros
in front of vsyn means greater value of n, hence higher recovery complexity. It
is natural for one to question on whether expressing the number of iterations in
term of n+ 1 is meaningful. More formally, one may ask
“Does such expression really help in reducing our effort in solving the given
problem?”
In this subsection, we will discuss the controversy mentioned above and show
that such expression is necessary for large class error rate but not all, i.e., ǫrec <
1/2.
To start the discussion, it is good to recall the prerequisite bound of our
efficiency claim showed in Eq. 14. Noting that the number of zeros padding
k − n∗ = m′ shall increase proportional to the value of h2(2ǫss) for it to hold.
This can be argued in the sense that given any recovery error parameter ǫrec ∈
[(2k∗)−1, 2ǫss], one have to try 2
k∗h2(ǫrec) iterations to look for the solution of
error vector e′ ∈ Erec of weight ⌊k
∗ǫrec⌋. Since Cin(w) = c
∗, the total number of
possible value for c∗ must be bounded by the possible values of w ∈ W , which
is at most 2k
∗
. In other words, if there are total number of 2m
′
possible values
for c∗, at least 2m
′
≤ 2k
∗
number of random guesses are needed to ensure one
can always reveal c∗ exactly.
Under the average-case scenario when ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4) (or equivalently
ǫrec ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/2)), one shall have the recovery algorithm to try maximally
2k
∗h2(2ǫss) iterations to search for e′ in recovering c∗ from the worst-case error.
Since the number of possible value for c∗ is denoted as 2m
′
, the searching for e′
shall stop at most 2k
∗h2(2ǫss) < 2k
∗
= 2m
′
− 1 iterations to yield a meaningful
efficiency claim in the sense that it can always do better than random guesses of
at least 2m
′
= 2k−n
∗
trials manifested by the number of zero paddings in front
of vsyn.
In fact, it is practically more efficient to express 2m
′
= poly(n) + 1 ≤ 2k
∗
rather than n+ 1. This is because despite Eq. 14 holds with linear size of com-
plexity O(n) (by expressing 2m
′
= n+ 1), large value of n would lead to longer
operation time (practically) for the remaining step of RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f , which are
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bounded in O(n3). Even if expressing 2m
′
= poly(n)+ 1 ≤ 2k
∗
is suffice to show
our recovery algorithm should operate in poly(n) polynomial time in the sketch
size. Keeping the value n small indeed offers better efficiency guaranty both in
term of complexity and practice, since small n implies both O(n3) and poly(n)
are small. Therefore, meaningful efficiency claim implies at most
2k
∗h2(2ǫss) = 2m
′
− 1 = 2−(k−n
∗) − 1 = poly(n) ≤ 2k
∗
− 1
iteration in searching e′ over larger class of worst-case error rate which can be
precisely described as
2ǫss ≤ h
−1
2
(
log(2m
′
− 1)
k∗
)
= h−12
(
log(poly(n))
k∗
)
= h−12
(
log(2(k−n
∗) − 1)
k∗
)
< h−12
(
k − n∗
k∗
)
≤ 1/2.
Then, follows Eq. 7, the recovery error can be described exactly as
β = 2−(k−n
∗) = 2−m
′
= 1/(poly(n) + 1) ≤ 1/poly(n).
Above results demonstrated that the recovery error is at most 1/poly(n), hence
tighter upper bound can be used to describe β = 1/poly(n). This means that
the recovery error β is also poly(n) reducible. It follows sufficiently large value
of n accompanies with correctness in reducing the error itself described as β =
1/poly(n). In such a case, it is succinct to describe k−n∗ using some polynomial
function poly(n) ≤ 2k
∗
− 1 to show efficient error tolerance for large class of
worst-case error, arbitrary close to fraction of 1/2.
On the other hand, under the worst-case scenario when ǫss = 1/4 (or equiva-
lent ǫrec = 1/2), one would need 2
k∗h2(1/2) = 2k
∗
number of iterations in searcing
for e′. Therefore, no any advantages can be gained by using our recovery algo-
rithm to recover the exact value of c∗ compared to random guessing of 2k
∗
trials
for all possible values of c∗. Hence, meaningful efficiency claim cannot achieve
in this case. Above scenario can be well described using the notion of perfect
secrecy, first studied by C. Shannon (1949) [21].
Based on the above discussion, one can conclude that expressing the number
of iterations in term of k − n∗ = log(poly (n) + 1) ≤ k∗ is always necessary
for average-case scenario but not for worst-case scenario to achieve meaningful
recovery efficiency claim with poly(n) complexity. This result lead to the refined
Eq. 14 and yield the requirement (bound) of meaningful efficiency claim over
large class of worst-case error for RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f described as
k∗h2(ǫrec) ≤ k − n
∗, (15)
where
k − n∗ = log(poly(n) + 1) ≤ k∗,
holds for average-case scenario.
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11 Propositions Formalisation
This section provide summary of our derived results of correctness and efficiency
for 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉. In particular, we formalized them into two major
Propositions in the following paragraphs.
By Eq. 7 - 15, we can formalise the following Proposition to characterize the
correctness of RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f for t(+) number of error in efficient manner with
BCH codes.
Proposition 2. Let k∗ ≥ k − n∗ ≥ 3 where k − n∗ = log(poly(n) + 1). Given
any error rate ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4), ǫrec ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 2ǫss], and ‖w ⊕ w
′‖ ≥ 0 s.t.
k∗h2(ǫrec) ≤ k − n
∗
Then, for sufficiently large n, there exits BCH codes for Cin ∈ {0, 1}
k∗ and
Cout ∈ {0, 1}
n where
Pr[RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f(SSΩ,Cin,Cout(w,N, ǫss), w
′, N, ǫrec) = w ] ≥ 0.875
can be achieved efficiently operating in time poly(n) and the maximum achievable
error tolerance rate is 2ǫss < 1/2.
It is natural to ask whether the bound for k − n∗ ≥ 3 can be generalized to
k − n∗ ≥ 1, thus one obtains a tighter bound for m′ derived in Eq. 7. Noting
that a tighter bound for m′ ≥ k − n∗ ≥ 1 implies the existence of larger class of
[n, k, t] linear codes which can be determined using our construction (by looking
the most suitable value of ξ) for any sources w (given w′) of minimum distance
at least ‖w ⊕ w′‖ = ⌊k∗ξ⌋ ≥ ⌊k∗ǫss⌋ ≥ 0.
Nonetheless, we will show that the answer for this question is positive which
allow one to simply choose two random generator matrices for Cin and Cout given
some error parameter ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4). In such a case, the selection of Cin
and Cout no longer necessary to be BCH codes. Simply making sure the value of
n is sufficiently large to show correctness with proper number of zeros padding
to form vsyn and v
∗, it follows that if exp(−2nǫ2ss) ≤ 1/2, then Eq. 7 should hold
for k−n∗ ≥ 1. Thus, Pr[RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f(SSΩ,Cin,Cout(w,N, ǫss), w
′, N, ǫrec) = w ] ≥
0.5. One could also run the recovery with different value of ǫrec ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/2)
or try ⌊k∗ǫrec⌋ = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ⌊k
∗/2⌋ until the first affirmative answer is obtained
to determine the most suitable tolerable error t(+) as discussed in the last section.
The recovery procedure can always done better than random guessing and its
complexity can be bounded by some polynomial function poly (n) follows the
efficiency argument discussed in Section 10.6. Based on above reasoning, we
shall have the following proposition to formalize 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 as
an efficient sketching and recovery algorithm for all inputs of minimum distance
‖w ⊕ w′‖ ≥ 0.
Proposition 3. Let k∗ ≥ k − n∗ ≥ 1 where k − n∗ = log(poly(n) + 1). Given
ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4), ǫrec ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 2ǫss], and ‖w ⊕ w
′‖ ≥ 0 s.t.
k∗h2(ǫrec) ≤ k − n
∗
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Then, for sufficiently large n, there exits [n, k, t]2 linear codes for Cin ∈ {0, 1}
k∗
and Cout ∈ {0, 1}
n where
Pr[RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f(SSΩ,Cin,Cout(w,N, ǫss), w
′, N, ǫrec) = w ] ≥ 0.5
can be achieved efficiently operating in time poly(n) and the maximum achievable
error tolerance rate is 2ǫss < 1/2.
The results in Proposition 2 and 3 have also suggested the NP-complete problems
mentioned in [18] and [19] can be solved efficiently in polynomial time by using
algorithm pair 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉. Follows the work in [22] stated, if
any NP-complete problem possesses a polynomial time algorithm to solve, then
so does every NP-problem, and hence we shall have P=NP.
12 Security
Recall the minimum information required to show correctness using RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f
could be expressed as the number of zeros padding to vsyn, which is k − n
∗ as
long as n is sufficiently large. Any adversary should be able to gain certain min-
imum information due to the zeros padding. This minimum information leakage
is independent of how liberal or conservative is the selection of the input string
w. Rather, it is a limit (lower bound), which required to be set in before con-
structing any error tolerance system, to satisfy certain minimum requirement
of correctness. Formally, follows Eq. 4 and Eq. 7, such minimum information
leakage can be used to express the conditioned min-entropy of RV:
H˜∞ (Ψ |W ) ≥
⌊
log(1/ exp (−2nǫ2ss))
⌋
≥ m′ = k − n∗ ≥ 3.
Noting that the result in Proposition 3 would give tighter result, leads to
H˜∞ (Ψ |W ) ≥
⌊
log(1/ exp (−2nǫ2ss))
⌋
≥ m′ = k − n∗ ≥ 1. (16)
Above results showed a tight lower bound min-entropy requirement for any
sources of at least bit (m ≥ 1). Note that such entropy measurement is computa-
tional in the sense that it merely depends upon how the user parametrize the al-
gorithm pair 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 for Cin and Cout with k
∗ ≤ n∗ < k ≤ n.
12.1 Computational Secure Sketch Implies Information-Theoretic
Secure Sketch
This section gives a more general discussion on the implication of a standard
secure sketch is in fact computational derivable.
Fuller et al., [9] have showed negative result on computational relaxation of
information-theoretical secure sketch requirement. In particular, for hamming
metric space, computational secure sketch assumed to retain high Hill entropy
(pseudo-random entropy) implies error correction code with approximately 2m
′
points that correct t random error. Their proof relies on the existence of Shannon
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code, which can correct arbitrary random errors t′ ≤ t. The same result has first
implicitly stated by Dodis et al., (see Section 8.2 in [6]) where the main idea
is by the conversion of worst-case error into random error by using random
permutation function π which being part of the public sketch. Nevertheless, the
proof itself is non-constructive because it was still an open question on how to
construct an efficient Shannon code.
It is not difficult to verify that our findings agreed on above argument with
explicit construction of the algorithm pair 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 viewed as
an efficient Shannon code. More precisely, the sketching algorithm SSΩ,Cin,Cout
serves to encode any noisy input w and the recovery algorithm RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f
can be used for decoding.
We now show that our construction meets the well-studied computational
bound (Gilbert-Varshamov (GV) Bound) and coincides with the info-theoretic
bound (Shannon bound) as an optimal error correction code.
To do so, we shall use the derived computational bound for RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f to
be efficient and correct with probability at least 1 − 1/poly(n) is given as (see
Proposition 3 and Eq. 15):
k∗h2(ǫrec) ≤ k − n
∗ (computational). (17)
Let (k − n∗)/k∗ = log(poly(n) + 1)/k∗ = 1 − R where R is of rate 0 ≤ R ≤
1− 1/k∗ (since log(poly(n) + 1) ≤ k∗ and k− n∗ ≥ 1). Apply such result to Eq.
17, we obtain:
R ≤ 1− h2(ǫrec) ≤ 1− h2(ǫss) ≤ 1− h2(1/2k
∗) < 1 (Shannon Bound), (18)
which is indeed the Shannon bound with any source of size k∗ ≥ 2 (where k ≥ 3)
for it to be meaningful. Same thing applied for the upper bound which attained
the GV bound for R in average-case scenario (i.e., ǫss ∈ [(2k
∗)−1, 1/4)) described
as:
R ≥ 1− h2(2ǫss) > 0 (GV −Bound). (19)
Note that when the number of zero padding k − n∗ > k∗, the rate R becomes
negative. Therefore, restricting the number of zero padding k − n∗ ≤ k∗ is
necessary to ensures the achievable rate R is positive. Note that the value of R
is inversely proportional to the order of poly(n) and the sketch size n. Given the
sketch size n is decreased, it follows poly(n) is decreased thus the rate R should
be increased.
Observe that both Eq. 18 (Shannon bound) and Eq. 19 (GV bound) can
achieve rate R < 1 arbitrary close to one given k∗ is sufficiently large. Applied
this result into our construction, this implies for any input of size k∗ ≥ 2, for
sufficiently large n, there exist a good encoding and decoding function which
can be characterized by algorithm pair 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 where k
∗ ≤
n∗ < k ≤ n follows. Nonetheless, these two bound are subjected to the same
minimum rate R > 0, where same upper bound of source entropy loss can be
described using log(poly(n)) ≤ log(2k
∗
− 1) for the average-case scenario and
log(poly(n) + 1) = log(2k
∗
) = k∗ for the worst-case scenarios.
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Based on above reasoning, computational secure sketch implies information
theoretic secure sketch, where both of them are subjected to the same upper
bound and lower bound (where R ∈ (0, 1)) with entropy loss at most k∗.
Follows the correctness formalized in Proposition 3, and the security reason-
ing above, the Proposition below is given to characterize our construction as a
efficient secure sketch for average-case scenario.
Proposition 4. For m′ ≥ 1. Algorithm pair 〈SSΩ,Cin,Cout ,RecΩ,Cin,Cout,f〉 is an
efficient (M1,m,m
′, t(+))-secure sketch with parameter k
∗ ≤ n∗ < k ≤ n (for
sufficiently large n). It can correct fraction of worst-case errors arbitrary close
to 1/2 (i.e., t(+) < ⌊k
∗/2⌋).
12.2 Reduction from Fuzzy min-entropy to Shannon entropy
As computational secure sketch implies information theoretic ones, it is natural
to ask how our construction related to the usage of fuzzy min-entropy in defining
the system security. Nonetheless, we here show that Shannon entropy is indeed a
necessary and sufficient condition to show security for any sources with non-zero
min-entropy.
To support our claim that Shannon entropy is necessary and sufficient, we
recall the statement saying that a list of possible RVs in different distributions
{Φ1, . . . , Φ|supp(Ess)|} ∈ Ψ can be generated from a list of possible noisy strings
over a family of distributions {W1, . . . ,W|supp(Ess)|} ∈ W after the random error
parsing. Meanwhile, the original distribution of random variableW where w ∈W
is concealed in W . Looking for w is equivalent to look for W over W , which
means meaningful security can be claimed by measuring theminimum fuzzy min-
entropy of every possible distribution forW overW (after random error parsing).
However, we argued that it is difficult to precisely model all possible distribution,
especially for large entropy distributions. This is because large entropy sources
usually accompany with large input size k∗ and large number of points 2m
′
.
Modelling individual distribution of large number of points 2m
′
require high
computational cost and computationally inefficient.
Arguing that the worst-case security should offer maximum probability in
getting similar RVs within maximised tolerance tmax (see Section 8). We there-
fore characterize the maximum probability using the conditioned minimum en-
tropy of the RVs (given the noisy strings). Such result can easily derived using
Hoeffding bound described in Eq. 4, we restate it here:
H˜∞ (Ψ |W ) = − log
(
EW←W [Pr[Ψ = Φ |W =W ] ]
)
≥ − log
(
Ew′←W ′
[
max
φ′
Pr
[
Φ ∈ Btmax(φ
′)
∣∣∣W 6∈ Bt′
(+)
(w′)
]])
≥ log(1/ exp (−2nǫ2ss)).
It is not difficult to see that above equation computes the minimum fuzzy min-
entropy among all possible RVs distributions (over Ψ) concerning to maximum
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tolerance distance tmax (conditioned on t
′
(+)). Such result yielded a reduction
from fuzzy min-entropy to minimum entropy measurement over the original dis-
tribution of the variable W concerning t′(+), hold for all input string w ∈W .
However, merely showing reduction from fuzzy min-entropy to min-entropy
is not enough, our goal is to reduce min-entropy to Shannon entropy. Such reduc-
tion is in fact done with the formalization of Proposition 2 and 3 with sufficiently
n and number of zeros padding k − n∗. These result eventually lead us to the
derivation of the Shannon bound and GV bound in computational manner (Eq.
18 and 19). Noting that the derived bounds on Eq. 18 and 19 have removed the
o(1) term compared to the actual bounds derived in [23] [24] [25]:
R ≤ 1− h2(p)− o(1) (actual Shannon bound)
R ≥ 1− h2(2p)− o(1) (actual GV bound),
this is mainly because of the exact bound we used for p = ǫss ∈ [(2k)
−1, 1/4]
(for both average and worst-case scenarios) rather than limiting p ∈ (0, 1/4).
In light of this, Shannon entropy is necessary and sufficient condition to show
meaningful security for a standard secure sketch.
13 Comparison
Security Bound for Secure Sketch
Computational
/Info-theoretic
Best possible security
derived in [11]
H∞ (W ) ≥ m ≥
Hfuzzt,∞ (W )− log(1− β)
Computational
/Info-theoretic
FRS sketch(universal
hash functions) [11]
H∞ (W ) ≥ m ≥
Hfuzzt,∞(W )− log(1/β)−
log log(supp(W ))− 1
Computational
/Info-theoretic
Layer hiding hash (strong
universal hash
function)[10]
H∞ (W ) ≥ m ≥
Hfuzzt,∞(W )− log(1/β)− 1
Info. theoretic
Fuzzy commitment with
generic syndrome
decoding [7]
H∞ (W ) ≥ t log(n)
(when t≪ n)
Info. theoretic Fuzzy vault [4] H∞ (W ) ≥ t log(n)
Info. theoretic Improved Fuzzy vault [6] H∞ (W ) > t log(n) + 2
Info. theoretic Pinsketch [6] H∞ (W ) ≥ t log(n+ 1)
Computational
/info-theoretic
Proposed H∞ (W ) ≥ m ≥ k
∗h2(ǫrec) =
H(Erec)
Table 1: Summary of security bound of existing secure sketch in terms of
fuzzy-min entropy (with β > 0), min-entropy, and Shannon entropy.
Table 1 depicted the security bound (upper bound min-entropy requirement)
for existing secure sketch construction. Compared to the existing secure sketch
constructions our construction is capable of claiming computational security for
all sources with min-entropy m ≥ 1.
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An important highlight, we showed reduction from fuzzy-min entropy to
Shannon entropy, hence our security can be simplified into merely depends upon
the input error distribution defined using Shannon entropy, i.e., m ≥ H(Erec).
More precisely, by definition of min-entropy, m never larger than H(Erec), thus
m = H(Erec) to be exact, which means Shannon entropy is necessary and suf-
ficient to describe m. Besides, it can be verified easily our derived security
bound covered the best possible security stated in [11] with fuzzy min-entropy
Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) ≥ 1 (for m ≥ 1).
14 Conclusion
Existing secure sketch constructions have shown limitation in providing security
for sources with low entropy, i.e., lower than half of its input size. To overcome
such limitation, recent approaches [9], [10] suggested to construct a secure sketch
where its security property only holds for computationally bounded attacker.
Such computational construction relies on fuzzy min-entropy measurement, ac-
companies with stringent requirement s.t. the user must have precise knowl-
edge over the sources distribution. However, under the practical scenario, many
sources, for instance biometric (human face, iris, and fingerprint) are difficult to
model, hence assuming precise knowledge over such sources is unrealistic.
In this work, we proposed an explicit construction for secure sketch. We
adopted the usage of RV for sketching to facilitate the understanding of the
input distribution. Besides, the noisy environment of any source with minimum
entropy m ≥ 1 is stimulated by parsing random error to it. Our construction
supports efficient recovery with bounded probability of error parametrized by the
number of zero padding to the syndrome vector vsyn. The recovery algorithm
works adversarially and efficiently under an event where the distribution of the
random error e ∈ Ess parsed into the input source is unknown.
For security, we showed reduction from the usage of fuzzy min-entropy to
Shannon entropy to claim security over any sources of min-entropym ≥ H(Erec) ≥
1. Our results allow the computational derivation of info-theoretic bound (Shan-
non bound), lead us to the calm over computational secure sketch implies info-
theoretical secure sketch.
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